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Abstract 
Why does the strength of class voting vary over time? Recent research has emphasized 
factors to do with the structure of political choice at the party level. This article examines 
different aspects of this choice, and investigates whether voters are more likely to respond 
to the social cues or policy cues that parties send voters. The results from the British context 
suggest that the former are more important than the latter. The central implication of this 
finding is that social representation matters, and that the social background of political 
representatives influences the ways in which voters relate to political parties.  
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 Introduction 
The extent to which social divisions within society are expressed politically is a long 
established topic of controversy. Whereas most of the controversies over description and 
measurement have been resolved, many of the controversies over explanation remain. Why 
is (was) class such a major influence on voting behaviour in Britain? Why has the impact of 
class on vote declined over time? And more generally, why does its impact vary? What 
factors condition the political salience of social divisions? Answers to these questions have 
tended to fall into one of two camps: those that privilege social structural factors and those 
that emphasize political choice factors. The former – which dominated the early literature – 
tended to view political divisions as simple reflections of social conditions. This view is 
neatly summed up by Lazarsfeld et al who famously wrote: “A person thinks, politically as he 
is socially.”2 According to this ‘bottom-up’ approach, changes that have occurred within the 
electorate over the last 50 years, such as rising living standards, the spread of affluence, 
social mobility, and the emergence of new issues have undermined the salience of 
traditional group identities and made voters more individualistic.3 Accordingly, the salience 
of social divisions has declined over time, and this in turn has led to a decline in class voting, 
which  - despite rising levels of inequality – apparently signifies ‘the successful resolution by 
political systems of deep-seated conflicts of social interests’.4   
The problems with this account have been well documented.5 Firstly, on a 
theoretical level it is somewhat deterministic, and does not pay sufficient attention to how 
voters respond to the actions of political parties, and how parties themselves mobilise and 
appeal to different sections of society. Secondly, on an empirical level, these sociological 
accounts, which emphasise gradual processes of social change and individualisation, fail to 
capture much real world variation, and are unable to account for instances where the level 
of class voting increases as well as decreases. And thirdly, on a methodological level, 
evidence used to support this account has tended to rely on crude measures of the class-
vote relationship, such as the Alford Index.  
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More recent accounts of class voting have emphasised the role that parties play in 
mobilising social divisions and the ways in which voters respond to these mobilisation 
strategies.6  These studies have attempted to account for variation in the level of class 
voting over time with reference to supply side changes in the nature of the political choice 
that parties offer voters. This ‘political choice’ approach treats the political salience of class 
as a response to changes in the supply side of party policies.  Accordingly, as Przeworski puts 
it, ‘individual voting behaviour is an effect of the activities of political parties.’7 And thus 
changes in the electoral significance of class thus reveal more about how parties have 
changed than about how voters have changed. This line of thought has most recently been 
summed up by Evans and Tilley who argue that parties influence social divisions by 
differentiating themselves in ways that are relevant to the choices of voters on relevant 
axes of competition or, conversely, minimizing their differences on these axes so that they 
are less relevant to party preference.8  
According to this perspective voters do not behave blindly, but respond to the 
structure of the political choice between the parties with which they are faced. Previous 
research has tended to examine the structure of this choice in policy terms, most commonly 
understood in relation to parties’ position on left-right issues. The rationale for this dates 
back to Lipset et al’s early assertion that the working class tend to prefer redistributive 
policies, and so they vote for parties on the left, whereas the middle class try to resist these 
claims and so vote for parties on the right.9 Accordingly if parties differ in their policy 
outlook on left-right issues we would expect the salience, or strength of the class cleavage 
to be stronger than if the parties stand for much the same policy outlook.  
Recent empirical tests of this hypothesis have received support in a number of 
different contexts. Oskarson finds that class voting is higher in polarised political contests 
(with reference to the policy position of extremist parties) in Northern Europe and 
Scandinavia;10 Elff finds evidence that social classes respond to the policy offering of political 
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parties in six West European democracies;11 and country level case studies have also found 
policy effects on class voting in Britain12  and Italy.13 Collectively these studies go some way 
to showing that class voting is not purely a sociological phenomenon, and that the level – or 
strength of class voting – varies at least partially in response to political choice factors to do 
with policy. But these studies also leave a number of questions unanswered. For example, in 
the British context the policy polarisation thesis helps to explain why New Labour’s move to 
the right, and the ensuing process of policy convergence between Labour and the 
Conservatives led to a decline of class voting in the 1990s, but this approach does not shed 
light on why class voting was so strong in the 1960s and 1970s, when there was also little 
ideological difference between the two main parties. This suggests that there may be other 
factors at play which condition the relative strength of social cleavages.  
In this paper I build on these insights and examine the structure of political choice 
from a more sociological perspective; providing a link between the early sociological 
accounts of class voting and the more instrumentalist accounts of policy voting that have 
recently become popular. A key element of the political choice literature on class voting is 
the link between class position, class interests, and policy preferences. Accordingly voters 
perceptions of their interests are shaped by their class position, which in turn means that 
different social classes prefer different redistributive political programmes. The extent to 
which the working class feel that their interests are represented by a political party 
therefore depend upon the party’s policy platform. But policy representation is of course 
only one form of political representation, and it may be that voters are also responsive to 
other aspects of political representation, which hitherto have not been considered. In 
exploring this possibility I draw a distinction between political choice based on policy or 
‘substantive’ representation and political choice based on social or ‘descriptive’ 
representation. 
A useful starting point for thinking about this is Hanna Pitkin’s well-established 
typology of representation, which distinguishes between substantive and descriptive 
representation.14 Pitkin describes substantive representation as ‘acting in the interests of 
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the represented in a manner responsive to them’. Thus the working class may be 
substantively represented by a particular political party when that party advocates public 
policy which is in the interests of the working class. This is typically understood in terms of 
leftwing policies, for reasons outlined above. By contrast descriptive representation occurs 
when representatives mirror the social backgrounds of the represented. Thus, the working 
class may be descriptively represented by a political party when the MPs from that party are 
themselves from working class backgrounds.  
Whereas the descriptive representation of women and ethnic minorities has been on 
the increase in Britain over the last few years; the representation of other social groups, 
particularly the working classes has been declining.15   This was bought into sharp focus 
following the 2010 British General Election, when the coalition cabinet was almost entirely 
composed of millionaires (who occupied 23 out of the 29 posts). The cabinet contained 
more (rich) ethnic minorities and women than it did people from working class 
backgrounds. Although there is a great deal of research on the changing composition of 
political elites, we still know relatively little about how these changes have affected the 
ways in which citizens orientate themselves towards politicians and parties, and the impact 
that these changes have had on individual-level patterns of voting behaviour. In this paper I 
examine the impact of policy representation and social representation on the extent to 
which social classes support different political parties. Do voters respond to social cues as 
well as political cues? What impact, if any, have changes in the social background of political 
representatives in Britain had on the ways in which voters participate in the political 
process? 
 
How does social representation matter? 
Discussion on social representation in political science has tended to focus upon whether 
politicians will enact policies that are beneficial to other members of their social group in 
the population as a whole.  Do women MPs ‘better represent’ women’s issues than men? 
Do ethnic minority MPs better represent ethnic minority issues? And do working class MPs 
better represent the issues of the poor? Research on these questions has tended to produce 
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mixed results, and there is ongoing academic debate as to whether descriptive 
representation leads to substantive (policy) representation or not.16 The arguments for why 
it might have a certain intuitive appeal. MPs from privileged backgrounds may be ‘less in 
touch with the mass electorate’ and less in touch with working class voters. Working class 
MPs may also be more likely than upper class MPs to put forward or support left-wing 
policies and it may therefore be harder for the leadership of a left wing party to change 
party policy and move to the right when there are many working class MPs within the party 
who would potentially be resistant to such a move. Indeed, it is notable that with respect to 
the Labour Party in Britain Neil Kinnock’s attempt to modernise the party in the 1980s 
began with reforming the rules on candidate selection rather than with a drastic overhaul of 
policy.  
Although there is a certain amount of controversy over whether or not a link 
between descriptive and substantive representation actually exists, there is much stronger 
evidence to suggest that the public believe such a link exists. And when it comes to the 
determinants of voting behaviour, the public perception that this link exists may carry more 
weight than whether or not the link actually exists in practice. For example, there is a 
growing body of work that shows, at least as far as voters are concerned, descriptive – or 
social representation matters, and all else being equal, people with a given social 
characteristic prefer candidates or leaders who share that characteristic: women are more 
likely than men to vote for female candidates;17 and black people are more likely than white 
people to vote for black candidates.18 More generally, sociodemographic dissimilarity with a 
political figure (e.g., party leader) tends to decrease a voter's expected utility from the 
election of that person.19 
One explanation for this process is that the public use the social background of 
politicians as a heuristic short-cut for making judgements about what sort of policies the 
party will pursue. Gathering information on candidates' and parties' policy positions and 
coming up with an opinion of one's own is obviously a more costly activity than observing 
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the social characteristics of candidates and party leaders.20 And whereas voters might be 
uncertain about what policies, for example, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
really wants to pursue based on what he says in public; voters might draw much firmer 
inferences based on his privileged social background and Eton upbringing, and assume that 
whatever policies he does pursue will be in the interests of the rich and well-off. According 
to Popkin then "demographic facts provide a low-information shortcut to estimating a 
candidate's policy preferences... characteristics such as a candidate's race, ethnicity, 
religion, gender, and local ties are important cues because the voter observes the 
relationship between these traits and real-life behavior as part of his daily experience".21 
Similarly, Johnston et al. argue that "it is entirely reasonable to ask how much like oneself 
the potential agent is. The more an agent resembles oneself the more he or she might be 
expected reflexively to understand and act on one's own interests ... we might reasonably 
prefer leaders who embody our own demographic characteristics".22  
Indeed, the idea that social similarity effects judgements and behaviour has a long 
history in the social psychology literature. For example, as far back as 1958 Heider argued 
that interpersonal similarity, be it similarity in attitudes, personality characteristics or social 
background variables, promotes a sense of ‘‘belongingness,” or closeness.23 More recent 
research has found that people tend to like similar others more than dissimilar ones, 24 and 
are typically more emotionally invested in close than distant others.25 Interpersonal 
similarity also has important implications for information processing.  Liviatan et al show 
that people construct different representations of similar and dissimilar individuals even 
when they are provided with the same information about those individuals.26 These 
representations, in turn, affect people’s judgments about similar and dissimilar others’ 
actions. For example, Rim, Uleman and Trope show that students are more likely to draw 
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the trait inference, rude, if a disruptive audience-member is from a different university (i.e., 
is socially distant) than if he is from the same university (i.e., is socially proximal).27 
This body of work implies that people are more receptive to information from similar 
rather than dissimilar individuals. From this we might expect that if a politician is socially 
similar to a voter (that is from the same class background) then the voter will be more likely 
to ascribe positive attributes to what the politicians is saying, and be more likely to believe 
what they are saying and think they are sincere. To a working class voter, it may therefore 
be more credible when a politician from a strong working class background says that they 
will stand up for the underprivileged, than when a multi-millionaire member of the 
aristocracy says the same thing. Thus, if a party contains many working class MPs, working 
class voters may be more likely to think that the party in question represents and stands up 
for their interests. This suggests that the greater the proportion of MPs from working class 
backgrounds within a party, the more the electorate will perceive that party as representing 
the interests of the working class, and the more likely the working class will be to vote for 
the party in question. Thus the social background of MPs influences party image which in 
turn influences voting behaviour. 
 
Hypotheses 
To investigate these claims I test a number of hypotheses. Recent research has shown that 
the strength of the class-party association in the UK is associated with policy difference 
between the two major parties.28 Firstly then I simply aim to replicate this finding using an 
independent data source, and examine whether there is a link between class voting and 
policy representation on left-right issues. As Evans and Tilley state, “Party polarization 
should increase the magnitude of the association between social position and party choice; 
party convergence should reduce it. When there is ideological convergence the strength of 
the signals from parties to voters is weakened and the motivation for choosing parties on 
interest/ideological grounds derived from class position is reduced, and vice versa.”29 
Accordingly, class voting is shaped by variations in the policy representation of left-right 
issues between the parties. 
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 H1: The strength of the class-party association is associated with the policy difference on
 left-right ideology of the two main parties. 
 
The second hypothesis that I test refers to the extent to which class voting is related to 
social representation, and the cues that parties send voters by selecting MPs from different 
social backgrounds. When the parties are socially distinctive in terms of the class 
backgrounds of their MPs, the motivation for choosing parties on class grounds is increased, 
and vice versa. Thus class voting is shaped by variations in the social representation of the 
working class between the parties.  
H2: The strength of the class-party association is associated with the social difference on
 class background of MPs from the two main parties. 
 
The third hypothesis examines the nature of the joint impact of policy and social 
representation on class voting. If there is a link between social and policy representation, 
then voters may only pay attention to policy signals insofar as they come from credible 
social sources. It may be that it is more important to have people ‘like you’ in parliament 
than it is to have people who claim to speak on your behalf. Indeed, given the potential 
association between social representation and policy representation at the party level, it 
may be that the apparent association between policy representation and class voting is 
driven by variations in social representation, in which case we would expect the impact of 
policy difference on class voting to be mediated by the impact of the social difference 
between the parties. 
 
H3: The relationship between class-voting and policy is weakened by controlling for the
 social background of MPs. 
 
Data and Methods 
To test these hypotheses I analyse a merged dataset, which combines information on 
voters, parties’ policy positions and the occupational background of MPs. The data comes 
from three sources. First, to examine the social characteristics and voting behaviour of 
individuals over time, I use pooled cross-sectional survey data from the British Election 
Studies, 1964 to 2010.30 This series covers thirteen elections and consists of 35,597 
interviews. Secondly, to examine policy representation and the policy platforms of the 
political parties over time, I use Party Manifesto Data from the Manifesto Research Group.31 
And thirdly, to examine social representation and the occupational background of MPs, I use 
data from the Datcube project collated by the EurElite network.32 
The dependent variable is recall of vote choice in the last general election. In the 
British context the main class divide has been between the Labour party and the 
Conservative party, and so it is on these parties that I focus. The key independent variable is 
social class. To measure social class, I use a simplified version of the Erikson-Goldthorpe 
seven class schema, which categories people according to their occupation.33 Because of 
concerns over sample size and concerns over how well the skilled and semi-skilled 
categories are actually distinguished, the higher and lower professional categories and the 
working class categories are collapsed. However, the categories which are collapsed are not 
strongly distinguishable with respect to their pattern of party choice. Respondents are 
therefore classified into four class categories: Salariat (professional and managerial 
workers), Petty bourgeois (self-employed, small businessmen and farmers), Routine non-
manual, and Manual workers (including supervisors/foremen and skilled and unskilled 
workers).  
Following previous research, policy positions are estimated using party manifesto 
data.34 These data provide a useful indication of party positions since they represent the 
choices that the electorate faces before each election.  Moreover, as the content of party 
programs is often the result of intense intraparty debate, the CMP estimates should be 
reliable and accurate statements about parties’ positions at the time of elections. These 
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measures are generally consistent with those from other party positioning studies, such as 
those based on expert placements, citizen perceptions of parties’ positions, and 
parliamentary voting analyses, which provides additional confidence in the validity and 
reliability of these estimates.35 The CMP measures are based on content analyses of the 
programmes of the main political parties at every post-war election. The policy statements 
in each (‘quasi-’) sentence are classified into fifty-six policy categories over seven policy 
domains. Following the traditional Laver/Budge methodology, the left-right scores of the 
various parties can be computed by summing up the percentages of all the sentences in the 
left category, and subtracting their total from the sum of the percentages of the sentences 
in the right category. The policy difference between the parties is simply the difference 
between these two scores.  
To measure the social representation of the working class I use data from the 
Datcube project collected by the EurElite network. The Datacube is a major study of political 
representatives in Europe and contains information on the demographic background of 
elected representatives since 1850.36  The data comes from a variety of sources, with the 
more recent data on Britain between 1964 and 2010 used in this article drawn from the 
Nuffield Election Series.37 The occupational background of MPs are classified into eleven 
distinct categories.  The working class composition of the main political parties is calculated 
as the proportion of MPs in each party from a working class background (including 
supervisors/foremen and skilled and unskilled workers). The social difference between the 
parties is simply the difference between these two scores.  
 
Changing pattern of class voting in Britain  
The first task is simply to examine the association between class and vote choice in Britain 
over time.  Figure 1 displays the probability of voting Labour rather than Conservative for 
each social class since the 1960s. The pattern is now well known, and has been well 
documented elsewhere.38 The impact of class on vote has declined over the last 50 years, as 
can be seen by the narrowing of the gap between the lines in Figure 1. The probability gap 
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between the salariat and the working class voting Labour rather than Conservative has 
declined from over 0.4 in the 1960s to just 0.1 in the 2000s. The gaps between the other 
middle classes (routine non-manual and the petty bourgeois) and the working class follow 
similar though somewhat less pronounced trends. However, the pattern is not one of steady 
decline. During the early period there is little evidence of class dealignement and the 
pattern appears to be one of ‘trendless fluctuation,’39 but since the 1980s there appears to 
have been a distinct convergence between the classes, a pattern which is often attributed, 
at least since the 1990s, to New Labour’s ideological re-positioning.  
Figure 1 here  
 
Changing party positions on left-right ideology  
It is often claimed that the Labour party moved to the centre of the ideological spectrum in 
response to the changing social composition of the electorate and the shrinking of its core 
support base in the manual sector. From Figure 2 we can clearly see that the size of the 
working class population has steadily declined since the 1960s, while the size of the middle 
class population has steadily increased. Since the early 1980s the middle classes have 
overtaken the working classes in terms of size, and since 1987 the middle classes have 
comprised more than 50 percent of the electorate. These demographic changes would 
appear to provide a clear incentive to the Labour party to broaden its’ appeal among middle 
class voters, particularly, one would think, since the middle class overtook the working class 
as the largest occupational group in the electorate. 
Figure 2 here 
However, there is little evidence to support this claim. Whereas the size of the working class 
has steadily shrunk over the last 50 years there has not been a corresponding shift towards 
the right by the Labour party. Figure 3 shows how the main parties in Britain have shifted 
their left-right policy positions over the last half a century. During the first part of the period 
there was little difference between the Conservative and Labour positions, but – somewhat 
against the expectations of the strategic incentives hypothesis – during the 1970s the 
Labour party moved substantially to the left and stayed there for the best part of 20 years. 
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During this period there were thus clear ideological differences between the two parties. 
Since 1992, and in particular since 1994 when Tony Blair took over the leadership of the 
party there has been a process of policy convergence, with the Labour party moving 
towards the centre ground, and the Conservatives moving somewhat to the left. 
Figure 3 here 
Comparing Figures 1-3 suggests that there may be a number of inconsistencies with 
conventional accounts of the relationship between policy representation and class voting; 
and on the relationship between social change and policy representation. Firstly, during the 
high water mark of class voting during the 1960s there was little policy difference between 
the parties, and during the period of ideological polarisation during the 1980s there was 
little evidence of any increase in class voting. As Evans has pointed out, it is only really in the 
latter period that class voting and ideological polarisation appear to co-vary.40 Secondly, 
although there has been a steady decline in the size of the working class electorate, there 
has not been a correspondingly steady move to the right by the Labour party, and at times 
the Labour party has moved in the opposite ideological direction to the strategic incentives 
suggested by social change. Although this does not directly undermine the ‘political choice’ 
perspective, it does cast doubt on one of the key intervening variables that is thought to link 
social change and class dealignment, which is to do with how parties have responded to 
changes in the social structural composition of the electorate.41 So, although the top-down 
‘political choice’ approach makes some significant advances over previous, more sociological 
accounts of class voting, it also leaves a number of questions unanswered, and suggests that 
there is perhaps space for further research on the topic.  
 
Changing party representation of working class MPs  
The next task then is to consider social representation, and examine how the social 
representation of the working class within the two main parties has changed over time. If 
the proportion of working class MPs within the Labour party has declined over time, then 
the social signals that the party sends voters about what group the party represents will also 
have become weaker,  leading to a hypothesized decline in class voting. Figure 4 depicts the 
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changes that have taken place in the social background of Labour and Conservative MPs 
over the last 50 years. Although never high compared to the proportion of the working class 
in the population, the number of MPs with a background in manual work has fallen 
dramatically. In 1964, 20 percent of MPs had a working class occupational background, but 
by 2010 just 5 percent of MPs had such a background. This decline is almost entirely due to 
changes which have occurred within the Labour party, who were traditionally expected to 
represent working-class people. In 1964, Labour was not just a party for the working class, 
but was also a party that was substantially comprised of the working class, with over 37 per 
cent of the MPs coming from manual occupational backgrounds. By 2010 this fell to just 
under 10 per cent.  
 
Figure 4 here 
The decline in the proportion of working class Labour MPs starts in the 1980s, and continues 
during Labour’s long march to the centre instigated by Neil Kinnock. This sequencing 
appears to fit with the strategic incentives offered by changes in the social composition of 
the electorate, and although there is not much evidence to suggest that Labour moved to 
the right as the size of the working class population in the electorate declined; there is much 
clearer evidence to suggest that as the electorate became more middle class so did the 
party representatives.  
One obvious consideration is therefore to what extent variations in the social 
representation of the working class in political parties is actually a cause of class voting, as 
opposed to a being a response to class voting. The core hypothesis in this paper is that 
differences in social representation between the parties have a causal impact on the way in 
which voters from different social backgrounds relate to the parties, and is thus associated 
with variations in the level of class voting over time. However, an alternative causal 
narrative might be that as society has become more middle class people have become less 
likely to vote for working class politicians, and so consequently fewer working class 
politicians get elected to office. In this case social representation cannot meaningfully be 
seen as a cause of class voting, since it is itself a product of class voting. I will return to this 
point later in the paper. However, there are a number of factors which indicate that such an 
interpretation is faulty, and that the changes we observe in the social composition of MPs 
have not been driven by ‘bottom up’ factors to do with the voting behaviour of citizens but 
by ‘top down’ strategic decisions made by party leaders. Firstly, it is notable that following 
the heavy election defeats of 1979 and 1983 the proportion of working class Labour MPs did 
not fall. It does not therefore appear to be the case that there was an electoral backlash 
against working class MPs. It is only during the long march back to electability that the social 
profile of Labour MPs (and candidates) begins to change, and the biggest changes in the 
social profile of Labour MPs follows the big electoral gains of 1992 and 1997, when the party 
put forward many more middle class candidates.  
These changes in candidate selection can be traced to institutional changes that 
were implemented by Kinnock in a bid to modernise the Labour party during the 1980s. 
During this period the Labour party undertook reform of its selection process for 
parliamentary candidates to counter the impression that it was dominated by union 
interests. In the case of the electoral college, this meant banishing union leaders from the 
selection process. These institutional changes had a significant impact on candidate 
selection. Without the influence of the Unions, and in a bid to distance the party from the 
working class radicalism that the Unions were associated with, more and more middle class 
candidates were put forward.42  The effect of this process can be illustrated with reference 
to Pippa Norris’s 1992 and 1997 candidate studies,43 which show that the new candidates 
that the Labour party put forward were much less likely to think of themselves as working 
class than the incumbent MPs who were standing for re-election:  in 1992 58 percent of 
incumbent candidates thought of themselves as working class, compared to just 45 percent 
of the new candidates, and in 1997, 37 percent of incumbent candidates thought of 
themselves as working class compared to just 20 percent of new candidates. Evidently, the 
new candidates that were selected to stand tended to identify less with the working class 
than the incumbent candidates, and the changes that took place in the social background of 
Labour MPs were therefore driven by strategic choices about candidate selection made by 
the party rather than by bottom up processes to do with citizens voting behaviour. 
Moreover even if these strategic choices may have been informed by social change; they are 
exogenous to the relative impact of class on vote. 
                                                          
42
 see Quinn 2004. 
43
 see Norris and Lovenduski 1993, 1995. 
The result of these changes in recruitment has been a parliament with many fewer 
voices able to speak from working class experience, particularly on the Labour side of the 
House. Such changes in MPs’ occupational background have made parliament much less 
representative of the broader British population, and the Labour party much less 
representative of the working class whose interests it was traditionally supposed to 
represent. Parties in contemporary Britain have thus become ideologically less distinctive 
and also socially less distinctive. Whereas the former has received a great deal of attention, 
both within the literature on class voting and more broadly; the latter has not.  In the next 
part of the paper I redress this balance and investigate the extent to which the electorate 
responds to both social and policy cues.  
Class voting and social and political representation  
To test the hypotheses I link data on policy representation and social representation to 
pooled cross-sectional survey data, creating a hierarchical dataset in which individuals are 
nested within elections. I therefore specify a multilevel logit model to estimate how the 
class-party association varies according to the structure of political choice. At level 1 is the 
individual survey respondent, and at level 2 is the election. The general model is specified as 
follows:  
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where VOTE is party support (1 = Labour; 0 = Conservative) at election t, 0 is the constant, 
Class is the occupational background of the voter, POLDIF is the policy difference between 
the two main parties; Class*POLDIF is a cross-level interaction between class and policy 
difference, SOCDIF is the social difference between the two main parties; and Class*SOCDIF 
is a cross-level interaction between class and social difference. Controls are also included for 
basic demographics. In order to model the extent to which social classes differ in their 
voting behaviour I do not control for any attitudinal variables that may be endogenous to 
class at the individual level or policy difference and social difference at the party level, such 
as leadership evaluations, the economy, or party identification.44 Three different models are 
specified, which test the impact of 1) policy representation on class voting; 2) social 
representation on class voting; and 3) the joint impact of policy and social representation on 
class voting. The relevant parameter estimates from these models are reported in Table 1.45   
Table 1 here 
To test H1, Model 1 tests the impact of policy representation on class voting. The policy 
difference term is highly significant and negative, which indicates that people tend to be less 
likely to vote Labour when there are large ideological differences between the two parties. 
This is certainly consistent with the view that Labour’s move to the centre ground made the 
party more electable. The coefficient for the working class term is positive and also highly 
significant, indicating that even when we control for the policy difference between the 
parties people from the working class are significantly more likely to vote Labour than 
people from the salariat. In order to examine the impact that policy representation has on 
the level class voting an interaction term is specified between policy difference and social 
class. With respect to the working class, this has a significant effect in the expected 
direction. Working class people are significantly more likely than middle class people to vote 
labour when there are substantial policy differences between the two parties than when 
there is little policy difference. The extent of class voting therefore appears to respond to 
policy signals. For example, Model 1 predicts that the difference between someone from 
the salariat voting Labour and someone from the working class doing so would be about 39 
percentage points if there is a high level of policy difference between the parties (a CMP 
difference of 70, compared to the 1983 value of 68), but only 22 percentage points if there 
is much lower level of policy difference between the parties (a CMP difference of 10, 
compared to the 2001 value of 9). The model therefore supports H1 and replicates the 
findings of earlier research which suggests that the magnitude of the effect for class on vote 
depends upon the ideological difference between the two main parties.  
                                                          
44 For example, social differences at the party level may influence how different classes evaluate party leaders, 
and so leadership evaluations may themselves be a consequence of social differences. 
45
 The results are robust to the inclusion of additional controls for housing tenure and education (but data is 
not available for all years so these variables are not included in main models). 
To test H2, Model 2 tests the impact of social representation on class voting. We can 
see that the social difference term is significant and negative, indicating that people tend to 
be less likely to vote Labour when there are large social differences between the 
representation of working class MPs within the two main parties.  This, too, is consistent 
with the view that the social transformation of the Labour party into a more middle class 
body of MPs has made the party more electable. More interesting from a theoretical 
perspective though is that the interaction term between social difference and class is highly 
significant and in the expected direction. Working class people are significantly more likely 
than middle class people to vote labour when there are substantial social differences 
between the two parties than when there is little social difference. Class voting therefore 
appears to respond to the social signals that parties send voters by having MPs from 
different social backgrounds. For example, Model 2 predicts that the difference between a 
person from the salariat and the working class voting for Labour is 42 percentage points if 
there is a high level of social difference between the parties (a difference of 40, compared 
to the 1964 value of 36), but only 25 percentage points if there is a much lower level of 
social difference between the parties (a difference of 10, compared to the 2010 value of 8). 
The model therefore provides support for H2, and suggests that the effects of class on vote 
may depend on the social difference between the parties. Comparing the fit statistics 
between the two models we can see that the social representation model provides a better 
fit to the data than the policy representation model. This suggests that class voting may 
respond more to the social signals that parties send voters than the policy signals.  
Model 3 examines this possibility more systematically by testing the policy 
representation and social representation hypotheses simultaneously. As in previous models 
the main effects of both the policy difference and social difference terms are significant and 
in the expected direction. However, this time the interaction term with class is only 
significant with respect to social representation, and the interaction between class and 
policy difference is not significant. The magnitude of the interaction term between policy 
difference and the working class declines from a significant b=0.007 in Model 1 to a non 
significant b=0.001 in Model 3. By contrast, the magnitude of the coefficient for the 
interaction term between social difference and working class is unchanged at b=0.023 
between Models 2 and 3. These findings show that once we take social representation into 
account the strength of the class-vote association does not vary by policy representation. 
Voters may pay attention to policy signals in so far as they are consistent with the social 
signals that parties send voters, but there do not appear to be any additional effects of 
policy representation on class voting beyond those which are transmitted via social 
representation. This suggests that social representation not only drives the class-vote 
relationship; but also drives the association between policy difference and class-voting. 
As mentioned earlier, an obvious consideration is to what extent variations in social 
representation is actually a cause of class voting, as opposed to a being a response to class 
voting. An alternative causal narrative could be that parties have become more middle class 
in response to the diminishing importance of class on vote. Thus, as the political salience of 
class has declined, left wing parties have become more middle class in a bid to appeal to 
more middle class voters. However, if there is evidence that class voting responds to parties’ 
level of social representation from the previous electoral period, then this helps to rule out 
this possibility. On this point, there is strong evidence of temporal effects in the expected 
direction, and the class interactions with the lag variable of social representation (t-1) are 
highly significant (Table 2, Model 4). These estimates signify a process in which voters are 
responding to parties’ social differences rather than the other way round. These results 
stand up even if we restrict the sample to just the post 1974 period,46 which is when Evans 
and Tilley argue voters became more responsive to policy cues (Model 5).47 
Table 2 here 
We can get a clearer sense of the substantive impact of these findings by plotting the 
average marginal effects from the interaction between the lag of social difference and class. 
Figure 5 plots the difference that we would predict between a working class voter and a 
middle class voter casting their ballot for the Labour party at different levels of social 
difference between the two main parties. When parties are socially similar, model 4 predicts 
that the difference in Labour support between working class people and middle class people 
is just over 20 percentage points. This suggests that there are some persistent class 
                                                          
46 See Evans and Tilley 2012a. 
47 The results are also robust to the inclusion of a simple trend term to capture the secular decline thesis. The 
cross level interaction between the trend term and the working class is not significant (p=0.793) whereas the 
interaction between lagged social difference and the working class is still significant at the 10% level (p=0.076) 
and in the expected direction. 
differences that the model is unable to explain. Thus we cannot reduce class voting 
completely to the social difference between parties. However, class differences become 
much more pronounced as the level of social difference between the parties increases. 
When the parties are socially distinctive (to a level similar to 1964) the difference in Labour 
support between working class people and middle class people almost doubles, at 41 
percentage points.  The baseline difference in support for Labour between the working class 
and the middle class is substantial, yet if the parties are socially distinctive the model 
predicts that the effect of class on vote substantially increases. Social representation clearly 
matters to people’s party choices. 
Figure 5 here 
 
These results indicate that there is a strong over-time relationship between social 
representation and class voting. But if the social cues thesis is correct, then there is no 
reason why there should not also be a cross-sectional relationship between social 
representation and class voting, whereby class voting is stronger in constituencies where 
there are clear social differences between the two main parties (i.e. when the Labour 
candidate is from a working class background). To investigate this possibility I link data from 
the 2001 British Representation Survey to the 2001 British Election Survey.48 I specify a 
multilevel logit model with individuals nested in constituencies to estimate how the class-
party association varies according to the occupational background of the Labour candidate. 
The general model is specified as follows:  
)*( 3210 jijjij LABCLASSClassLABCLASSClassfVOTE   , 
where VOTE is party support (1 = Labour; 0 = Conservative), 0 is the constant, Class is the 
occupational background of the voter, LABCLASS is the occupational background of the 
Labour candidate; and Class*LABCLASS is a cross-level interaction between voter’s class and 
                                                          
48 The 2001 BRS is selected because it had the highest response rate and largest effective sample size when 
merged with the BES. The survey was mailed to 1,859 candidates from the main British political parties and in 
total 1085 politicians replied, representing a response rate of over 58 percent (for full details and the 
questionnaires see www.pippanorris.com). Although the response rate was (as usual) higher among 
parliamentary candidates than MPs, the study includes about one third of elected MPs, and it is broadly 
representative by party and MPs’ occupational background (for full methodological details of this and previous 
surveys in the series see Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; and Norris and Lovenduski, 1995).  
Labour candidate’s class. Controls are also included for age, sex, education, and religion at 
the individual level, and economic deprivation at the constituency level. Three different 
models are specified, which examine the impact of candidate’s class on class voting 1) 
across all seats; 2) across seats where the Labour candidate is a challenger; and 3) across 
seats where the Labour candidate is the incumbent.  
Table 3 here 
The relevant parameter estimates from these models are reported in Table 3. Across all 
three models we can see that the sign for the class coefficient of the Labour candidate is 
negative, indicating that people are less likely to vote Labour when the candidate is working 
class, controlling for the level of economic deprivation in the constituency. This is 
particularly evident when the Labour candidate is also the sitting MP (Model 3), which is 
consistent with the findings from the earlier models presented above.  
Across all three models we can also see that the interaction term between voter’s social 
class and candidate’s social class is in the expected direction. Given the relatively small 
sample sizes we have to be a little cautious in our interpretation of the results, but 
nonetheless the evidence is broadly supportive of the idea that working class voters tend to 
be relatively more likely than the middle class to vote Labour when the Labour candidate is 
also working class.49 Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient for this interaction term 
is over four times larger when the Labour candidate is the sitting MP than when he or she is 
a challenger. This suggests that it is the class background of MPs rather than candidates per 
se that matters most. Thus, in addition to shedding light on the over-time dynamics in the 
strength of class voting, the social representation thesis also appears to shed light on 
variation in the strength of class voting across constituencies. Moreover, there is also 
evidence to show that way the party looks matters to voters, and that the class background 
of the Labour candidate influences the party’s image.50 From Table 4 we can see from the 
cross-level interaction that working class voters are more likely to regard Labour as being 
left wing when they have a working class MP in their constituency. Based on the average 
                                                          
49 This finding also holds for analysis done on the 1992 election. See online Appendix for details.  
50 I specify a multilevel logit model where the dependent variable is the respondent’s placement of the Labour 
party on a left-right scale recoded so that 1=Left of centre (0-4) and 0= Centre or right of centre (5-10). 
Controls are added for age, sex, education and respondent’s self placement on a left-right scale (recoded as 
above) at the individual level and economic deprivation at the constituency level. 
marginal effects, the model predicts that among the salariat 38% think Labour is a left wing 
party when the incumbent is middle class compared to 33% when the incumbent is working 
class, and that among the working class just 16% think Labour is a left wing party when the 
sitting MP is middle class compared to 42% when the sitting MP is middle class. Thus, 
working class voters are more likely to think that the Labour party is left-wing and stands for 
traditional working class policy interests when their local MP is from a working class rather 
than middle class background.51 As far as the working class are concerned then, there is indeed 
the perception that a link exists between descriptive and substantive representation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Recent research on class voting has emphasised the ways in which parties shape social 
divisions. The ‘old orthodoxy’ that the influence of class on vote has declined because social 
change has weakened the distinctiveness of social classes has been has been firmly 
rejected,52 and the new wave of political choice literature instead relates dynamics in class 
voting over time to variations in the policy platforms of parties.53 In short, without party 
strategy that emphasizes class differences in interests, class position is less likely to be 
strongly associated with party choice.    
 In this contribution I have sought to build on many of the insights from this emerging 
literature and in doing so to broaden the discussion of political choice to consider other 
ways in which parties may represent (or be seen to represent) the interests of different 
social groups. By focussing on the distinction between policy representation and social 
representation I find much stronger evidence for social representation effects on class 
voting. This shows that the social cues parties send voters matter; and that voters are 
perhaps not as instrumental or individualistic in their voting decisions as is sometimes 
portrayed in the policy representation literature. Indeed, in some ways the concept of social 
or descriptive representation is much closer to the original principle of group voting that 
                                                          
51 An alternative view might be that working class MPs are more left wing than middle class MPs, and so voters 
with working class MPs are more likely to regard Labour as Left wing because they receive stronger policy 
cues. However, this interpretation does not appear to have much validity. If this was the case then only the 
main effect for MP’s class would be significant and there would not be any interaction with voters’ class since 
middle class voters with working class MPs would also be more likely to think that Labour is left wing.  
52
 see Evans and Tilley 2012a. 
53
 See Evans and de Graaf 2013. 
underpins the idea of social cleavages. If class voting were based solely – or even mainly – 
on policy, then the phenomenon could perhaps more accurately be described as issue 
voting rather than cleavage voting. Whereas policy representation implies an individualistic 
and instrumental calculus (which may be aggregated to the group level) social 
representation implies a more group orientated and expressive calculus, which explicitly 
engages with social identity theory and social distance theory. Voters may think that people 
from their own social group will be more likely to represent their interests, but there is 
potentially also an expressive dimension to this calculus, and just the presence of people 
from one’s own social group in a position of political power might make voters feel closer to 
the party in question, and better represented by it. Indeed, there is plenty of evidence from 
the social psychology literature to suggest that such mechanisms might exist, which could 
be explored further. 
Focussing on issues of social representation then not only makes an empirical 
contribution to the study of class voting and the politicisation of social divisions more 
generally, but also provides a clear link to the theory of social cleavages, which emphasizes 
the importance of group membership. In doing so this approach also provides a coherent 
narrative of class voting in Britain over time, and we can draw a link between social change, 
party strategy, and voting behaviour.  One implication of this research is that the social 
composition of parliament matters. It influences how people participate in the political 
process, and, potentially, it might also influence how people view politics and engage in 
politics more widely. This suggests that there may be empirical as well as normative 
implications to the on-going debate about the social representativeness of political 
representatives. Recent concerns about the extent to which MPs are socially representative 
of the wider population, both in terms of class, age, sex, region and ethnicity may have 
serious implications for how people from different backgrounds relate to politics.  
 Bibliography 
Alford, Robert. 1963. Party and Society. The Anglo-American Democracies. Chicago: Rand & 
McNally. 
Andersen, Susan, Noah Glassman, and David Gold. 1998. Mental Representations of the 
Self, Significant Others, and Nonsignificant Others: Structure and Processing of Private and 
Public Aspects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology  75: 845–861. 
Aron, Arthur, Elaine Aron, MichaelTudor, and Greg Nelson. 1991. Close Relationships as 
Including Other in the Self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology  60: 241–253. 
Bellucci, Paolo and Oliver Heath. 2012. The Structure of Party-organization Linkages and the 
Electoral Strength of Cleavages in Italy, 1963-2008. British Journal of Political Science 42 (1): 
107-135. 
Bendyna, Mary, and Celinda Lake. 1994. Gender and Voting in the 1992 Presidential 
Election. Pp 237-54 in The Year of the Woman: Myths and Realities, edited by Elizabeth A. 
Cook, Sue Thomas, and Clyde Wilcox. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Berscheid, E. 1985. Interpersonal Attraction. Pp 413-84 in Handbook of Social Psychology, 
edited by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson. New York: Random House. 
Best, Henreich, and Maurizio Cotta, eds. 2000. Parliamentary Representatives in Europe  
1848–2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries. Oxford: 
Oxford University  Press. 
Budge, Ian, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum. 
2001. Mapping Political Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–
1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Butler, David., and Anthony King. 1965. The British General Election of 1964. London: 
Macmillan. 
Byrne, Don. 1971. The Attraction Paradigm. New York: Academic Press. 
Byrne, Don, Gerald Clore, and Philip Worchel. 1966. Effect of Economic Similarity-
Dissimilarity on Interpersonal Attraction. Journal of Personality and Social   
Psychology 4: 220–224. 
Campbell, Rosie, Joni Lovenduski, and Sarah Childs. 2010. Do Women Need Women 
Representatives? British Journal of Political Science 40 (1): 171–94. 
Childs, Sarah and Paul Webb. 2010. Constituting and Substantively Representing Women: 
Applying New Approaches to A UK Case Study. Politics and Gender, 6 (2): 199-223. 
Clarke, Harold, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart and Paul Whitely. 2004. Political Choice in 
Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cook, Elizabeth. 1994. Voter Responses to Women Senate Candidates. Pp 217-36 in The 
Year of the Woman: Myths and Realities, edited by Elizabeth Cook, Sue Thomas, and Clyde 
Wilcox. Boulder, CO: Westview.  
Cotta, Maurizio, and Henreich Best, eds. 2007. Democratic Representation in Europe: 
Diversity, Change, and Convergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Criddle, Byron. 2010. More Diverse, yet More Uniform: MPs and Candidates.’ Pp 306-329 in 
The British General Election of 2010, edited by Philip Cowley and Dennis Kavanagh. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cutler, Fred. 2002. The Simplest Shortcut of all: Sociodemographic Characteristics and 
Electoral Choice. Journal of Politics 64 (2): 466-490. 
Dalton, Russell. J. 1984. Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced 
Industrial Democracies. Journal of Politics, 46: 264-84.  
Dolan, Kathleen. 1998. Voting for Women in the 'Year of the Woman’. American Journal of 
Political Science 42(1): 272-93. 
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row 
van der Eijk, Cees, Mark Franklin, Thomas Mackie, and Henry Valen. 1992. Cleavages, 
Conflict Resolution and Democracy’. Pp 406-32 in Electoral change: Responses to Evolving 
Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries, edited by Mark Franklin, Thomas 
Mackie, and Henry Valen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Elff, Martin. 2009. Social Divisions, Party Positions, and Electoral Behaviour. Electoral Studies 
28 (2): 297-308. 
Erikson, Robert and John H. Goldthorpe. 1992. The Constant Flux. A Study of Class Mobility 
in Industrial Societies. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Evans, Geoffrey. 2000. The Continued Significance of Class Voting.  Annual Review of 
Political Science 3:401–17. 
Evans, Geoffrey, Anthony Heath and Clive Payne. 1999. Class: Labour as a Catch all Party?’ 
Pp 87-101 in Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-term Perspective, edited by 
Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris. London: Sage. 
Evans, Geoffrey and James Tilley. 2012a. How Parties Shape Class Politics: Explaining the 
Decline of Class Party Support. British Journal of Political Science, 42 (1): 137-161. 
Evans, Geoffrey and James Tilley. 2012b. The Depoliticization of Inequality and 
Redistribution: Explaining the Decline of Class Voting. Journal of Politics 74(4): 963-976. 
Evans, Geoffrey and Nan Dirk de Graaf, eds. 2013. Political Choice Matters: Explaining the 
Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ezrow, Lawrence and Georgios Xenokasis. 2011. Satisfaction with Democracy and Parties’ 
Policy Offerings. Comparative Political Studies, 44 (9): 1152-1178. 
Franklin, Mark. 1992. The Decline of Cleavage Politics. Pp 383-405 in Electoral Change: 
Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries, edited by Mark 
Franklin, Thomas Mackie, and Henry Valen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Franklin, Mark. 1985. The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral 
Choice, 1964-1983. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Heath, Oliver. 2011. The Great Divide: Voters, Parties, MPs and Expenses. Pp 120-146 in 
Britain at the Polls 2010, edited by Nicholas Allen and John Bartle. London: Sage. 
Heath, Oliver and Paolo Bellucci. 2013. Class and Religious Voting in Italy: The Rise of Policy 
Responsiveness. Pp 309-34 in Political Choice Matters: Explaining the strength of class and 
religious cleavages in cross-national perspective, edited by Geoffrey Evans and Nan Dirk de 
Graaf. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heath, Anthony, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice. 1985. How Britain Votes. Oxford: 
Pergamon. 
Heath, Anthony, Geoffrey Evans, and Clive Payne. 1995. Modelling the Class-party 
Relationship in Britain, 1964-1992. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics 
in Society) 158 (3) 563-574. 
Heider, Fritz. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. Oxford: Wiley. 
Huddy, Leonie. 1994. The Political Significance of Voters' Gender Stereotypes. Research in 
Micropolitics 4: 169-93.  
Huddy, Leonie, and Nayda Terkildsen. 1993. Gender Stereotypes and the Perception of Male 
and Female Candidates. American Journal of Political Science 37(1): 119-47. 
Johnston, Richard, Andre Blais, Henry Brady, and Jean Crete. 1992. Letting the People 
Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The Transformation of European Social Democracy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry. 2003. Extracting Policy Positions from 
Political Texts using Words as Data. American Political Science Review 97: 311-331. 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Tom Rice. 1983. Localism in Presidential Elections: The Home 
State Advantage. American Journal of Political Science 27(3): 548-56. 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg. 2008. 
The American Voter Revisited. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Lipset, SM, Lazarsfeld, PF., Barton, AH, and Linz, J. 1954. The Psychology of Voting: an 
Analysis of Political Behaviour’. Pp 1124-1175 in Handbook of Social Psychology, edited by G. 
Lindzey. MA: Addison-Wesley.  
Liviatan, Ido,, Yaacov Trope, and Nira Liberman. 2008. Interpersonal Similarity as a Social 
Distance Dimension: Implications for Perception of Others’ Action. Journal of   
Experimental Social Psychology 44 (5): 1256-1269. 
Newcomb, T. M. 1956. The Prediction of Interpersonal Attraction. American Psychologist 11: 
575–586.  
Norris, Pippa and Joni Lovenduski. 1993. If Only More Candidates Came Forward: Supply -
Side Explanations of Candidate Selection in Britain. British Journal of Political Science 23(3): 
373-408. 
Norris, Pippa, and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. Political Recruitment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Oskarson, Maria. 2005. Social Structure and Party Choice.’ Pp 84-105 in The European Voter:  
A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, edited by Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Popkin, Samuel L. 1991. The Reasoning Voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Przeworski, Adam. 1985. Capitalism and Social Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Przeworski, Adam, and John Sprague. 1986. Paper Stones: a History of Electoral Socialism. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Quinn, Tom. 2004. Electing the Leader: The British Labour Party's Electoral College. The 
British Journal of Politics & International Relations 6: 333–352. 
Rim, SoYon,  James S. Uleman, and Yaacov Trope. 2009. Spontaneous Trait Inference and 
Construal Level Theory: Psychological Distance Increases Nonconsious Trait Thinking.  
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (5): 1088-1097. 
Sigelman, Carol, Lee Sigelman, Barbara Walkosz, and Michael Nitz. 1995. Black Candidates, 
White  Voters: Understanding Racial Bias in Political Perceptions. American Journal of 
Political Science 39(1): 243-65. 
Swers, Michelle. 2002. The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in 
Congress. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Tate, Katherine. 1993. From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections. 
Cambridge: Russell Sage, Harvard University Press  
Terkildsen, Nayda. 1993. When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing  
Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring. American   
Journal of Political Science 37(4): 1032-53.  
Thomassen, Jacques, ed. 2005. The European Voter:  A Comparative Study of Modern 
Democracies.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tolleson Rinehart, Sue. 1992. Gender Consciousness and Politics. New York: Routledge.  
Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1:  Probability of voting Labour vs. Conservative by class, 1964-2010 
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 Figure 2:  Class composition of British electorate, 1964-2010 
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 Figure 3:  Left-right positions of parties, 1950-2010 
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 Figure 4:  Working Class MPs in Britain, 1964-2010 
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 Table 1:  Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Labour vs. Conservative vote  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Social Class       
  Routine Non Manual 0.249** 0.092 0.162 0.108 0.171 0.110 
  Petty Bourgeois -0.384** 0.146 -0.392* 0.176 -0.371* 0.179 
  Working Class 1.235*** 0.083 0.954*** 0.101 0.952*** 0.103 
Policy Difference -0.022*** 0.005   -0.011*** 0.004 
Policy diff by Class        
  Policy diff by RNM 0.003 0.002   -0.001 0.003 
  Policy diff by PB -0.001 0.004   -0.002 0.005 
  Policy diff by WC 0.007*** 0.002   0.001 0.003 
Social Difference   -0.046*** 0.008 -0.044*** 0.007 
Social diff by Class        
  Social diff by RNM   0.009* 0.005 0.010 0.006 
  Social diff by PB   -0.000 0.007 0.002 0.009 
  Social diff by WC   0.023*** 0.004 0.023*** 0.005 
Constant 0.842 0.184 1.210 0.227 1.329 0.188 
Wald Chi Square 2100 (9)  2120 (9)  2131 (13)  
Log likelihood -11942  -11930  -11927  
Notes: Reference category is salariat. Models also control for age and sex. All models 
contain 13 surveys and 19,307 individuals. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.005.  
 Table 2:  Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Labour vs. Conservative vote  
 
 Model 4 
All years 
Model 5 
Post 1974 
 B S.E. B S.E. 
Social Class     
  Routine Non Manual 0.046 0.128 0.064 0.133 
  Petty Bourgeois -0.533* 0.219 -0.543 0.231 
  Working Class 0.822*** 0.120 0.829*** 0.125 
Policy Difference -0.015*** 0.005 -0.025*** 0.007 
Policy diff by Class      
  Policy diff by RNM -0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.004 
  Policy diff by PB -0.006 0.005 -0.006 0.007 
  Policy diff by WC 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Lagged Social Difference (t-1) -0.028** 0.010 -0.007 0.014 
Lag Social diff by Class      
  Lag Social diff by RNM 0.019*** 0.007 0.014 0.009 
  Lag Social diff by PB 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.015 
  Lag Social diff by WC 0.024*** 0.006 0.023*** 0.008 
Constant 1.377 0.231 1.226  
Wald Chi Square 1987 (13)  1753 (13)  
Log likelihood -11388  -10216  
Notes: Reference category is salariat. Models also control for age and sex. Models 4 contains 
12 surveys and 18,412 individuals. Model 5 is restricted to the post 1974 period and 
contains 10 surveys and 16,515 individuals. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.005.  
 Figure 5   Predicted difference between voting Labour for working class people 
compared to middle class people by level of social difference between the 
parties  
 
 
Notes: These are predicted probabilities from Model 4 of Table 2, and refer to the difference 
in percentage points between working class and middle class people voting Labour.  
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Table 3:  Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Labour vs. Conservative 
  vote, 2001  
 
 Model 1: 
Lab vs. Con vote 
All seats 
Model 2: 
Lab vs. Con vote 
Labour challenger 
Model 3: 
Lab vs. Con vote  
Labour incumbent 
 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Voter’s Social Class       
  Routine Non Manual 1.67 0.94 1.51 1.09 2.012 2.17 
  Working Class 2.02*** 0.71 1.67* 0.85 2.41 1.50 
Labour Candidate’s 
Social Class 
      
  Working Class -0.88** 0.33 -0.35 0.44 -1.69*** 0.58 
Labour Class by 
Voter’s Class  
      
  by RNM 0.19 1.03 - - -0.587 1.59 
  by WC 0.87 0.64 0.47 0.92 2.27* 1.03 
Economic Deprivation 0.39*** 0.07 0.37*** 0.08 0.44*** 0.15 
Econ deprivation by 
Voter’s Class  
      
  by RNM -0.18 0.18 -0.14 0.21 -0.35 0.36 
  by WC -0.18 0.13 -0.07 0.16 -0.42 0.27 
Constant -0.97  -1.28  0.287  
Chi Square 95 (13)  74 (13)  40 (13)  
Log likelihood 755  547  187  
N 663  493  170  
Notes: Reference category is Middle class. Due to small sample size salariat and petty 
bourgeoisie categories have been merged. Models also control for age, sex, education and 
religion. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.005. 
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Table 4:  Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Labour Party Image, 2001  
 
 Labour ideology (L vs. C-R) 
 B S.E. 
Voter’s Social Class   
  Routine Non Manual 0.529 0.645 
  Working Class -1.083* 0.517 
Labour Candidate’s Social Class   
  Working Class -0.295 0.393 
Labour Class by Voter’s Class    
  by RNM -0.104 1.002 
  by WC 1.751* 0.733 
Economic Deprivation -0.087 0.081 
Sex -0.002 0.008 
Age 0.863*** 0.280 
L-R self placement 0.863*** 0.288 
Education 0.151 0.092 
Constant -1.98 0.939 
Chi Square 29 (12)  
Log likelihood -170  
N 291  
Notes: Reference category is Middle class. Due to small sample size salariat and petty 
bourgeoisie categories have been merged. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.005.  
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Appendix A 
As a robustness check I have carried out additional analysis to see if the findings from the 
cross-sectional analysis of 2001 reported in Table 3 also holds in other election years. To 
investigate this possibility I link data from the 1992 British Representation Survey to the 
1992 British Election Survey. As before I specify a multilevel logit model with individuals 
nested in constituencies to estimate how the class-party association varies according to the 
occupational background of the Labour candidate. The general model is specified as follows:  
)*( 3210 jijjij LABCLASSClassLABCLASSClassfVOTE   , 
where VOTE is party support (1 = Labour; 0 = Conservative), 0 is the constant, Class is the 
occupational background of the voter, LABCLASS is the occupational background of the 
Labour candidate; and Class*LABCLASS is a cross-level interaction between voter’s class and 
Labour candidate’s class. Controls are also included for age, sex, education, and religion at 
the individual level, and economic deprivation at the constituency level. Due to data 
limitations it is not possible to replicate Models 2 and 3 from Table 3, so the analysis below 
is based on the occupational background of all Labour candidates for which data is available, 
and does not discriminate by incumbency status.  
Broadly speaking the results from Table 5 broadly confirm the pattern of associations 
reported in Table 3. Given the sample size and missing data we should be somewhat 
cautious in our interpretation the results, but nonetheless the findings are reassuring in the 
sense that they are broadly consistent with the earlier analysis. The sign for the class 
coefficient of the Labour candidate is negative, suggesting that people are less likely to vote 
Labour when the candidate is working class, controlling for the level of economic 
deprivation in the constituency. The interaction term between voter’s social class and 
candidate’s social class is also in the expected direction. This indicates that working class 
voters tend to be relatively more likely than the middle class to vote Labour when the 
Labour candidate is also working class.  
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Table 5:  Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Labour vs. Conservative 
  vote, 1992 
 
 Model 1: 
Lab vs. Con vote 
All seats 1992 
 B S.E. 
Voter’s Social Class   
  Routine Non Manual -1.58 1.54 
  Working Class -1.91 1.61 
Labour Candidate’s Social Class   
  Working Class -1.25 1.31 
Labour Class by Voter’s Class    
  by RNM 1.87 1.36 
  by WC 2.45 1.39 
Economic Deprivation -0.02 0.09 
Econ deprivation by Voter’s Class    
  by RNM 0.03 0.10 
  by WC 0.08 0.11 
Constant 1.31  
Chi Square 78 (16)  
Log likelihood -843  
N 1394  
Notes: Reference category is Middle class. Due to small sample size salariat and petty 
bourgeoisie categories have been merged. Models also control for age, sex, education and 
religion. 
 
 
